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WARNING: LABELING  
CONSTITUTIONS MAY BE  
HAZARDOUS TO YOUR REGIME 
SUZANNA SHERRY* 
“No answer is what asking the wrong question begets . . . .”1 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
What do the following cases have in common? In Boy Scouts of America v. 
Dale,2 the Court upheld the right of a private organization to ignore a generally 
applicable state statute prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.  In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of 
Boston,3 the Court upheld the right of parade organizers to exclude gay-rights 
banners.  In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,4 the Court permitted government 
funding of religious schools through vouchers issued to low-income parents.  
And in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,5 the 
Court required state funding of the printing costs of a proselytizing religious 
publication.  In each of these cases, a comparatively “conservative” association 
was pitted against “progressive” ideals.  In each of these cases, the Court sided 
with the association.  Do these cases therefore represent a conservative 
interpretation of the First Amendment?  In particular, is a conservative Court 
overprotecting conservative associations that are intermediate between the 
family and the state?6 
I would suggest that labeling these cases as conservative is a mistake.  Each 
can be described in either liberal or conservative terms.7  It is progressive to 
 
Copyright © 2004 by Suzanna Sherry 
 This Article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/lcp. 
*  Cal Turner Professor of Law and Leadership, Vanderbilt University. 
The author would like to thank Mark Brandon, Lisa Bressman, Paul Edelman, Dan Farber, and Bill 
Marshall for comments on earlier drafts of this Essay. 
 1. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 103 (1962). 
 2. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 3. 515 U.S. 557 (1995). 
 4. 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
 5. 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 6. Cf. John O. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville’s America: The Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence of 
Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002) (arguing that the enhanced protection of intermediate 
associations is part of a coherent vision of Tocquevillian democracy adopted by the Rehnquist Court). 
 7. Throughout most of this Essay, I use “liberal” and “progressive” interchangeably to mean a 
left-leaning political preference associated with Democrats like Edward Kennedy, and “conservative” 
to refer to the views of Republicans like Orrin Hatch and George W. Bush.  As others have noted, it is 
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allow citizens to come together in smaller communities that define their own 
goals and values, even if—or maybe especially if—those values are at odds with 
those of the larger polity.8  The state should not be permitted to impose its own 
values on such communities, whether it does so directly by imposing 
membership requirements or indirectly by withholding funding.  On the other 
hand, it is conservative to allow individuals to segregate themselves from those 
they consider inferior or offensive because such segregation diminishes the 
equal citizenship status of the excluded groups.  It is also conservative, in a 
religiously pluralist society, to use coercively raised monies to fund 
organizations whose primary mission is the teaching of specific religious 
doctrine. 
A better way to approach these cases, and to discuss their common failures, 
is to recognize that there are important, non-ideological values at stake on both 
sides of each of these cases.  In Dale and Hurley, the liberty of individuals and 
associations to choose their own communities, to take stances in opposition to 
the polity’s values, and to define themselves as they see fit conflicted with the 
polity’s interest in ensuring equality for all citizens.  In Zelman and 
Rosenberger, the positions are reversed: The interest in equal treatment of 
religious and nonreligious organizations conflicted with an individual liberty 
interest in not being forced to subsidize another’s religion.  The critical 
question, then, is how we resolve the frequent tension between liberty and 
equality.9  The answer depends not on politics, but on the weight we give to each 
value in the particular context of each case. 
This analytical framework allows us to draw some conclusions about the 
Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.  In the context of speech and 
association, the Court has, for almost half a century, been steadfast in its strong 
protection of liberty.  But it has sometimes erred in undervaluing the 
countervailing interest in equality.  In the context of religion, by contrast, the 
Warren Court tended to protect liberty, and the Rehnquist Court favors 
equality—and each Court’s decisions slight the opposing interest. 
Asking whether these or other cases that afford broad protection to 
intermediate associations are progressive or conservative, then, is asking the 
wrong question.  Ultimately, these cases present difficult choices among 
competing constitutional values. It is both disingenuous and dangerous to hide 
behind labels, or to minimize the importance of one value or the other, instead 
of directly confronting the tensions inherent in the Constitution.10 
 
not clear that any particular philosophy underlies these political preferences, and thus, I do not mean to 
evoke philosophical meanings of the two terms. In Part IV, I discuss the possible differences between 
the terms “progressive” and “liberal.” 
 8. Cf. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF AMERICA 91-97 
(1999). 
 9. Cf. DOUGLAS RAE, EQUALITIES (1981). 
 10. As I have argued elsewhere, ignoring or de-emphasizing one half of a conflicting dichotomy is 
an all-too-frequent phenomenon.  See Suzanna Sherry, Judges of Character, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
793 (2003); cf. William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 68, 
102 (1986) (suggesting that the Court is prone to similarly defining away conflicts). 
04_SHERRY_FINAL.FMT.DOC 11/16/2004  12:20 PM 
Summer 2004] LABELING CONSTITUTIONS 35 
II 
SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION 
The argument that the First Amendment does not lend itself to 
“conservative” or “progressive” interpretations suggests that, despite much 
academic commentary to the contrary, Boy Scouts of America v. Dale is not 
based on a conservative interpretation of the First Amendment.11  Instead, the 
political coloration of Dale and other First Amendment decisions turns entirely 
on context and competing values.  I explore this idea first in the context of 
speech, and then in the context of associational rights. 
A. Freedom of Speech 
The point may be seen most clearly in cases involving freedom of speech.  
Since at least the 1960s, the Supreme Court has adopted a strong (or thick) 
reading of the protections afforded by the Free Speech Clause.12  Uniform 
application of such a speech-protective position will take on either a progressive 
or a conservative cast depending on context—that is, on whose ox is being 
gored.  When speech-protective principles are applied to conservative attempts 
to regulate progressive speech, we get progressive results: Schoolchildren can 
neither be forced to pledge allegiance,13 nor be forbidden from wearing black 
armbands to protest the Vietnam War;14 communists and anarchists cannot be 
silenced;15 and flag-burners cannot be punished.16  But those same principles 
produce conservative consequences when progressives try to prohibit hate 
speech17 or pornography,18 to reduce the influence of money on politics,19 or to 
 
I am not the first to notice that the American constitutional regime is a mass of internal tensions, 
nor that resolution of these tensions must be contextual and pragmatic.  See, e.g., ROBERT C. POST, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995); Lisa Schultz Bress-
man, Accommodation and Equal Liberty, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1007 (2001). 
 11. It might be more accurate to say that an idealized Dale does not represent a conservative inter-
pretation of the First Amendment.  That is to say, the Court so distorted the facts in the case that the 
First Amendment analysis has hardly any role to play.  But had the Boy Scouts’ publicly avowed policy 
been as the Court disingenuously described it, the case would have embodied a neutral, or even slightly 
progressive, interpretation of the First Amendment’s implied right of expressive association. For a 
thoughtful analysis of the Court’s treatment of the Scouts’ avowed position on homosexuality, see 
David McGowan, Making Sense of Dale, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 121 (2001). 
 12. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, All the Supreme Court Really Needs to Know It Learned from the 
Warren Court, 50 VAND. L. REV. 459 (1997). 
 13. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 14. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 15. Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Whit-
ney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 16. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
 17. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (intent to intimidate must be proven); R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); see also Collin v. Smith, 
578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). 
 18. See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Hudnut v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 475 U.S. 1001 
(1986). 
 19. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
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protect judicial independence.20  The details may differ, but the principle is the 
same: Protect vigorously anything that even looks like it might qualify as 
expression.21 
It is certainly possible to imagine a consistently progressive or conservative 
interpretation of the Free Speech Clause.  Indeed, when one side or the other 
criticizes the latest Supreme Court decision, it is usually for a failure to adopt a 
politically correct attitude toward the First Amendment.  Each side wants to 
protect the speech it likes and to exclude from the Amendment’s reach the 
speech it dislikes.  That different factions are displeased each time the Court 
invalidates restrictions on speech is evidence of the political neutrality of the 
Court’s interpretation.  One might label this speech-protective stance liberal 
insofar as it favors individual autonomy over government censorship, but it is 
liberal in the broad philosophical sense rather than in the narrow ideological 
sense. 
Freedom of speech presents an easy case for political neutrality because the 
countervailing values are either very weak themselves or only weakly 
implicated.22  For example, the interest in fostering patriotism (in the flag-
burning cases) or morality (in the obscenity cases) does not rise to the level of a 
constitutional value.  Censorship premised on one of these two goals cannot 
withstand much scrutiny when balanced against the strong constitutional 
protection of expression.  The argument made most often in the context of 
campaign finance or media concentration is that equality requires limitations on 
particularly powerful speakers to enrich the quality of public debate or allow 
other voices to be heard.23  This is a nascent movement, but it is one that has not 
had much resonance in American history: what might be called governmentally 
created “equality of influence” simply has not reached the level of a 
constitutional value in the way that equality of treatment has.  Finally, attempts 
to regulate hate speech or pornography fail for a different reason.  Although 
the countervailing interest in preventing discrimination is strong, the link 
 
 20. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). 
 21. Of course, there are unjustified exceptions to the rule of robust protection, but they, too, fall on 
both sides of the political spectrum.  See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (upholding restric-
tions on anti-abortion picketing); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997) 
(same); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (same); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 
173 (1991) (upholding restrictions barring recipients of Title X funds from providing abortion counsel-
ing to patients); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding criminal convictions for burn-
ing a draft card as a political protest). 
 22. This assertion—and indeed the whole paragraph—is not uncontroversial.  See, e.g., Robert 
Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, 
and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 680-84 (1990) (suggesting that competing 
values mark the boundaries of the protection accorded by the First Amendment). 
 23. See, e.g., Lillian R. Bevier, Money and Politics: A Perspective on the First Amendment and 
Campaign Finance Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1045 (1985); Owen M. Fiss, Money and Politics, 97 
COLUM. L. REV. 2470 (1997); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405 
(1986); Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First Amendment, 93 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1055 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Preferences and Politics, 20 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1991).  For an 
excellent critique of these and similar arguments, see MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKS: SPEECH, 
ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF DEMOCRACY (2001). 
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between hate speech or pornography and discrimination or inequality is too 
tenuous to support regulation.  For different reasons, then, a commitment to 
strong protection of speech rarely presents the Court with a robust 
counterweight. 
B. Freedom of Association 
Freedom of association cases engender more formidable conflicts between 
liberty and equality.  Although association is not listed as one of the rights 
protected by the First Amendment, the Court has repeatedly held that, because 
“[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly 
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association,” the First 
Amendment implicitly protects a right of association.24 And, just as the right to 
speak implies a corresponding right not to speak,25 the right to associate implies 
a corresponding right not to associate.  Thus, the Court has held that the First 
Amendment includes some protection against compelled association, at least 
insofar as expressive or intimate associations are concerned.26 
Once these preliminary inferences are established, some similarities 
between association and speech cases become apparent.  If one takes a broad 
view both of associational rights and of the variety of ways in which state action 
might impair them, a uniform interpretation of freedom of association will have 
different political consequences depending on context.  The same generous 
reading of the Constitution that protects the NAACP from Alabama’s attempt 
to force disclosure of its membership27 will also protect the Boy Scouts (or the 
parade organizers in Hurley) from forced association with those whose presence 
dilutes its message.  One can always draw distinctions among the various cases, 
but those distinctions undermine the breadth of the Court’s association 
jurisprudence and manipulate the doctrine to reach politically pleasing results.  
As with speech, the underlying principle seems to be that intermediate 
associations are deserving of strong protection across the board, and hence, that 
subtle distinctions are presumptively unwarranted. 
The Court’s history of recognizing and invalidating many types of 
interference with association rights further emphasizes the political neutrality of 
its insistence in Dale that employing homosexual scout leaders undermined the 
Scouts’ anti-homosexual message.28  The Court has invalidated rules requiring 
 
 24. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
 25. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S 557 (1995); Pac. 
Gas v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); W. Va. Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 26. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544-45, 548 (1987); 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 
234-35 (1977)).  For a theoretical defense of the right not to associate and a discussion of some of its 
implications, see generally Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. McFadden, HUAC, the Hollywood Ten, 
and the First Amendment Right of Non-association, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1669 (2001). 
 27. See NAACP, 357 U.S. at 449. 
 28. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653-56 (2000).  Of course, the Court first had to 
find that the Boy Scouts had adopted an expressive position against homosexuality.  There are prob-
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disclosure, by individuals or associations, of association membership;29 it has 
held that the Constitution prohibits applying anti-solicitation rules to litigation 
by political organizations;30 it has ruled that a state university cannot refuse 
recognition to a student association without proof that the association has 
refused to comply with campus rules;31 it has rejected attempts to deny various 
government benefits, including employment, on the basis of membership in 
associations;32 it has invalidated a variety of laws impinging indirectly on 
political parties;33 it has recognized a right against compelled financial support 
of advocacy by unions and other collective organizations;34 and it has held that, 
absent a compelling interest, states may not force intimate or expressive 
associations to accept particular members.35  Moreodver, as Daniel Farber 
points out, the Court has moved from a narrow position protecting a right of 
association to broader protection of the rights of associations as well.36  The 
breadth of these rulings illustrates that, as in the context of speech, the Court 
has adopted a uniformly strong interpretation of the right of association rather 
than a narrowly political interpretation. 
 
lems with that conclusion, as Justice Stevens pointed out in dissent.  Id. at 668-71 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); accord Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, The Expressive Interest of Associations, 9 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 595 (2001); Andrew Koppelman, Signs of the Times: Dale v. Boy Scouts of America 
and the Changing Meaning of Nondiscrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819 (2002).  The weakness of 
the majority’s conclusion on that issue, however, does not detract from my argument that protecting 
anti-homosexual expression is, in the context of the Court’s other association cases, apolitical rather 
than conservative. 
 29. Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982); Gibson v. Fla. Legisla-
tive Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 
(1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 478 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1959); 
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 30. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
 31. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
 32. Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 
(1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966). 
 33. See, e.g., Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000) (invalidating a state statute re-
quiring blanket primary elections); Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992) (invalidating a state law that 
barred a new political party established only in the city from fielding candidates under its party name in 
a county election); Tashijian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (finding that a state statute re-
quiring voters in a party’s primary to be members of that party impermissibly impinged on the party’s 
freedom of association); Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 
107 (1981) (holding that Wisconsin laws relating to the selection of delegates to national conventions 
unconstitutionally infringed Democrats’ freedom of association); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 
(1975) (holding that the national Democratic Party’s delegate-selection rules were constitutionally pro-
tected from state interference); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) (affirming a lower court decision 
invalidating an Illinois statute that barred voters from participating in a party’s primary election if vot-
ers had participated in another party’s primary within the preceeding twenty-three months). 
 34. See United States v. United Foods, 533 U.S. 405 (2001); Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 
(1990); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).  In these cases, the Court drew a distinction 
between the association’s use of funds for the benefit of its members (members may be compelled to 
contribute) and its use of funds to advocate positions (members may not be compelled to contribute). 
 35. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jay-
cees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).  In each of the cases, the Court concluded both that the particular association 
raising the constitutional challenge was not an intimate or expressive association, and that the state in 
any case had a compelling interest in prohibiting gender discrimination. 
 36. Daniel A. Farber, Foreword: Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive Associations and 
the First Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483 (2001). 
04_SHERRY_FINAL.FMT.DOC 11/16/2004  12:20 PM 
Summer 2004] LABELING CONSTITUTIONS 39 
If one accepts the Court’s characterization of the Boy Scouts’ expressive 
message, then, the First Amendment is strongly implicated.  The Court held 
that forcing the Scouts to accept homosexual scoutmasters—particularly those 
who are publicly seen as advocating tolerance of homosexuality—infringed 
their right of association.  This holding is fully consistent with other cases 
protecting progressive organizations from hostile interference by state entities.  
The political implications of protecting the Scouts’ associational rights arise 
from its context: Progressives would presumably applaud a ruling that the 
NAACP cannot be required to accept white supremacists as members, or that 
the B’nai Brith can exclude Christian proselytizers.37 
One might disagree with this description of the relationship between 
Dale and associational rights on three grounds.  First, there is the disingenuous 
way in which the Court identified both the organization’s message and the 
effect that retaining Dale as a scoutmaster would have on that message.  But 
that objection only works for the particular case: We can certainly imagine a set 
of facts that would support the Court’s conclusions; the Court would then 
legitimately be faced with the question of how much to protect the 
discriminatory organization. 
More important, one might question either the value of protecting 
intermediate associations or the way in which such associations are defined.  
Christopher Eisgruber, for example, suggests that to the extent that sub-
communities can undermine political unity, they should be protected with some 
caution.38  As Eisgruber himself recognizes, however, this is merely another way 
of asserting that there are competing constitutional values at stake.39  Of course, 
one could argue that there is no value in protecting intermediate associations at 
all, but I know of no scholar who takes that position.40  More narrowly, some 
 
 37. Readers can test themselves on a real case: Would it violate the Constitution to require the 
admission of women to a speech sponsored by the Nation of Islam?  See Donaldson v. Farrakhan, 762 
N.E.2d 835 (Mass. 2002). 
 38. Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Constitutional Value of Assimilation, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 87 
(1996).  For a contrary argument, see Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 
96 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1996). 
 39. Professor Eisgruber writes, 
On the one hand, because reflective constitutionalism is self-critical about the good, it values 
such sub-communities as sources of dissent and respects them as sincere efforts to pursue a vi-
sion of the good that might, after all, prove correct.  On the other hand, because reflective 
constitutionalism embraces a particular conception of the good, it regrets the extent to which 
dissident sub-communities deviate from that conception. 
Eisgruber, supra note 38, at 91.  Eisgruber ultimately concludes that allowing a sub-community to seg-
regate itself completely from the larger polity is more harmful than beneficial.  He reaches this conclu-
sion, however, in the context of Board of Education of Kiryas Joel Village School Distict v. Grumet, 512 
U.S. 687 (1994), in which the sub-community walled itself off from the larger polity by forming its own 
town and its own school district.  The Boy Scouts represent a rather different type of sub-community, in 
which the members are generally integrated into the society but come together periodically. 
 40. It is beyond the scope of this Essay to defend the value of intermediate associations, but others 
have done so.  See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000); Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, 
and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1 (2000); Abner S. Greene, Civil Society and Multiple Repositories of Power, 
75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 477 (2000). 
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might deny broad protection to intermediate associations because, empirically, 
they are likely to be conservative.41  Adoption of such a position may be a 
progressive political stance, but rejection of it is not necessarily conservative.  
(It might be conservative if the right of association is protected because of the 
empirical likelihood that it would benefit conservative organizations, but the 
Court’s history belies that possibility.)  Thus, the same neutrality that permeates 
the Court’s free speech cases—and often enrages one side or the other—
governs the Court’s recognition of a broad right of association. 
Finally, assuming associational rights should be protected, one might 
question how these rights ought to be defined.  The Court does not protect all 
human relationships that might arguably fall within the definition of 
“association.”  In particular, the Court has a mixed record with regard to what it 
labels intimate, rather than expressive, associations.  It has protected—not 
necessarily under the rubric of the First Amendment—the right of a 
grandmother to live with her two grandsons despite a contrary zoning 
ordinance,42 and the right of a government-paid lawyer to advocate, on behalf of 
his client, positions with which the government disagrees.43  On the other hand, 
it rejected a challenge to a zoning ordinance brought by unrelated college 
students wishing to live together,44 approved—for almost two decades—state 
laws criminalizing intimate relationships between consenting adults,45 and 
upheld a federal law interfering with the relationship between doctor and 
patient.46  A truly encompassing vision of associational rights might be more 
protective of these intimate relationships.  Even such an encompassing vision, 
however, would confront hard cases.  For example, how should a right of 
intimate association apply to a statute that allows grandparents to visit their 
grandchildren despite the objections of the children’s parent?47 
The Court’s reluctance to extend constitutional protection to every human 
relationship does not detract from the importance of the associational rights it 
has protected.  Indeed, the Court’s jurisprudence on what might be called 
“organizations” (thus excluding more intimate associations) is remarkably 
internally consistent.  That the Court got it wrong in Bowers v. Hardwick48 or in 
Rust v. Sullivan49 does not mean that it should therefore not extend protection 
to the NAACP, the Boy Scouts, or the Catholic Church. 
 
 
 41. For an argument that the proposition in the text is empirically false, see Dale Carpenter, Ex-
pressive Association and Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale: A Tripartite Approach, 85 MINN. L. REV. 
1515 (2001). 
 42. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
 43. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001). 
 44. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
 45. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 46. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
 47. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
 48. 478 U.S. at 186, overruled by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588. 
 49. 500 U.S. at 173. 
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C. Undervaluing the Equality Interest 
So far, then, associational rights are much like speech rights: The Court has 
protected associations irrespective of the ideological consequences.  Unlike 
most speech cases, however, there are serious competing constitutional values 
at issue in many association cases.  In particular, the Court has recognized a 
compelling government interest in preventing discrimination, which can 
sometimes trump an association’s right to choose its own members.  The Court 
failed to properly credit this interest in Dale.  Thus, the problem with Dale lies 
not in its thick interpretation of the First Amendment, but in its unduly thin 
vision of anti-discrimination principles. 
To illustrate this point in stark terms, consider the likely ruling if the Scouts 
had instead tried to exclude blacks.  Even if the Court had found that racism 
was part of the Scouts’ expressive message, the Court would probably have 
accepted New Jersey’s argument that it had a compelling interest in prohibiting 
race discrimination.  In Bob Jones University v. United States,50 the Court found 
the eradication of race discrimination sufficiently compelling to overcome a free 
exercise challenge; there is no reason to believe that it would be considered less 
compelling in the context of an associational claim.  In earlier cases involving 
gender, even the parties claiming an associational right to discriminate 
disavowed any right to discriminate on the basis of race.51 
One defender of Dale has suggested that liberals should applaud the 
decision because it can be used to protect private universities engaged in 
affirmative action from state laws prohibiting racial preferences.52  Strong 
protection for associational rights allows universities to use race-based selection 
criteria just as it allows the Boy Scouts to use sexuality-based criteria.  Whether 
uniformly vigorous protection of associational rights might serve that purpose, 
of course, depends on whether prohibiting discrimination against whites is 
thought to constitute a compelling state interest.  Again, then, whether a 
particular interpretation of freedom of association produces liberal or 
conservative results depends primarily on the breadth of our definition of 
discrimination rather than on our interpretation of rights of association. 
 
 50. 461 U.S. 574 (1983); see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
 51. See William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 68, 71 
& n.23 (1986) (citing briefs).  The Court has also found the eradication of gender discrimination com-
pelling enough to override associational rights in some cases.  See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary 
Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).  These cases also 
rested on the Court’s perception that the organizations at issue were not expressive associations and 
thus, that admitting women would not undermine any expressive message.  Nevertheless, the Court ex-
plicitly held in each case that the state had a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination.  Still, 
there is some doubt about whether gender discrimination laws could be applied to less commercial or-
ganizations.  This fact merely illustrates that anti-discrimination norms are not as strong in the context 
of gender as they are in the context of race.  See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, The Forgotten Victims, 63 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 375 (1992). 
 52. David E. Bernstein, The Right of Expressive Association and Private Universities’ Racial Prefer-
ences and Speech Codes, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 619, 621 (2001). 
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In Dale, however, the majority dismissed the state’s claimed interest in 
eradicating sexual orientation discrimination in a single conclusory sentence: 
“The state interests embodied in New Jersey’s public accommodations law do 
not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’ rights to freedom of 
expressive association.”53  The Court’s view of what might constitute invidious 
discrimination justifying state remedies is so thin that it cannot possibly 
encompass sexual orientation discrimination, so it did not even bother to argue 
the point.  It is evident that the Court treats equality norms—and anti-
discrimination legislation—differently depending on its own view of the 
wrongness of the discrimination.54  Eradicating discrimination is a sufficiently 
compelling interest to overcome even a strong right of association if that 
discrimination is based on race (at least when the discrimination is against the 
minority race), possibly sufficient if the discrimination is based on gender, but 
not even arguably sufficient if the discrimination is based on sexual orientation. 
Dale, then, is not a conservative interpretation of the First Amendment but 
rather a failure of vision akin to the Court’s previous refusal to invalidate 
sodomy laws55 or to subject sexual orientation discrimination to strict scrutiny.56  
It is an undervaluing of equality, not an overvaluing of liberty.  This distinction 
makes a considerable difference: it tends to rehabilitate the Court’s approach to 
the First Amendment, but impugn the Court’s definition of equality.  It thus 
tells us that looking hard at associational rights is focusing on the wrong aspect 
of the problem.  Ironically, the ultimate effect of this mistaken focus hurts 
liberal opponents of Dale and Hurley more than it does their conservative 
advocates.  These effects could be described in three ways. 
First, blaming Dale on a political interpretation of the First Amendment 
blinds us to the need to make hard choices.  This Essay suggests that Dale is 
right in its strong protection of associational rights but wrong in its failure to 
recognize rights against discrimination.  The two rights inevitably conflict, and 
the stronger the Court’s protection of each, the more conflicts will arise.57  We 
cannot satisfactorily resolve the conflict by simply ignoring or de-emphasizing 
one right or the other, especially since which one we ignore will likely depend 
 
 53. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 659 (2000). 
 54. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of “Coming Out”: Religion, Homosexuality, and 
Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2411, 2458-60 (1997).  Com-
pare Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (upholding the abrogation of sovereign 
immunity in the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), combating gender discrimination), with Bd. 
of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (invalidating the abrogation of sovereign 
immunity in the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), combating disability discrimination), and Ki-
mel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (invalidating the abrogation of sovereign immunity in the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), combating age discrimination).  For a discussion of 
the Court's different treatment of the types of discrimination at issue in these cases, see Suzanna 
Sherry, The Unmaking of a Precedent, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 231.  
 55. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003). 
 56. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 57. See William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right of Association, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 68 
(1986); see also Deborah Rhode, Association and Assimilation, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 106 (1986). 
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primarily on which right stands in the way of our current political desires.  Thus, 
diluting protection of associational rights based on the theory that such rights 
represent a conservative reading of the Constitution is no more a solution to the 
problem than is the Dale majority’s casual tolerance of discrimination.  
Labeling the Court’s emphasis on associational rights as conservative simply 
subordinates one constitutional value to another, just as the Court itself did in 
Dale.  Instead, we should grapple with the hard choice between freedom of 
association and freedom from discrimination.  This is just another version of the 
perennial conflict between liberty and equality, and we cannot avoid it by 
castigating or celebrating the analysis of the former. 
Second, a critique of Dale based exclusively on the First Amendment—such 
as the claim that only very small associations should be entitled to full 
associational rights58 or that expressive conduct should not be protected unless 
the state intentionally suppresses its message59—both waters down the 
protection afforded liberal organizations and fosters the production of parallel 
conservative theories of the First Amendment claiming that current doctrine is 
slanted in a progressive direction.60  After all, if liberals argue that the Court’s 
First Amendment jurisprudence is conservative just because it sometimes 
produces illiberal results, conservatives can point to opposite results and label 
the same jurisprudence overly liberal.  Those who value speech or association 
for its own sake will be the losers, as will whichever groups are, in the long run, 
on the wrong side of majoritarian politics.  One of the benefits of judicial review 
by independent judges is that it purports to be politically neutral, and, in the 
case of speech and association, it largely lives up to that promise.  There are 
enough instances in which the Court is crassly political,61 or simply ideologically 
motivated,62 without scholars making unfounded accusations. 
Finally, focusing solely on the First Amendment subjects progressives to 
charges of non-neutrality: they want progressive organizations to benefit from 
the Court’s consistently strong view of associational rights in cases such as 
NAACP v. Alabama,63 but they do not want to extend those benefits to 
conservative organizations.  It thus plays to those who deem judicial review 
simply politics by another name and encourages further politicization of the 
appointment process.  Progressives are likely to be sadly disappointed by the 
results of such a politicization: their success in defeating Robert Bork is unlikely 
to be repeated (especially after the most recent elections), and the past fifty 
years do not give much indication that progressives can out-mobilize 
conservatives. 
 
 58. See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, Freedom’s Associations, 77 WASH. L. REV. 639 (2002). 
 59. See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767 (2001). 
 60. For an interesting version of such a theory, see Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of 
Moderation: The Case of the Boy Scouts, 74 CAL. L. REV. 119 (2000). 
 61. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understand-
ing the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001). 
 62. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 63. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
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One final and transitional note: Perhaps progressives can change the level of 
analysis and simply argue that choosing liberty over equality is itself a 
conservative stance.  We should hesitate long before adopting such a global 
conclusion, and, in any case, the charge is unlikely to be true.  The next Part 
shows that in the case of the Religion Clauses, progressives may well favor 
liberty when it conflicts with equality. 
III 
RELIGION 
The jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses is notorious for its incoherence 
and its controversy.  Rather than wade into the morass, this Essay uses the 
dichotomy between liberty and equality developed in the previous Part to 
provide a different perspective on the Court’s precedents.  As with the right of 
association, examining the Religion Clauses through the lens of this tension 
demonstrates that it is misleading to label particular approaches as conservative 
or progressive. 
The first problem is identifying the competing constitutional values in the 
clauses.  The Court tends to speak of “neutrality” rather than liberty or 
equality; scholars use a plethora of terms in often confusing and contradictory 
ways.  It is easy to recognize an individual liberty interest in protecting freedom 
of expression, but it is not so easy to describe the types of liberty protected by 
the Religion Clauses.  Similarly, there is agreement on at least the core meaning 
of equality in the context of associations that want to exclude some people from 
membership, but the term “equality” is used in a variety of ways in the 
literature interpreting one or both of the Religion Clauses.  In short, although 
the constitutional values identified here are widely recognized, the labels are 
somewhat arbitrary—and my labels differ from the labels often used by religion 
law scholars. 
A. The Free Exercise Clause 
However it is described, the central modern question in Free Exercise 
Clause jurisprudence arises when neutral, generally applicable laws conflict 
with religious beliefs and thus impose a particular burden on religious 
believers.64  Litigated examples include a law requiring parents to send their 
children to school through age sixteen, as applied to Amish families who object 
on religious grounds to schooling past the eighth grade;65 a military rule 
prohibiting the wearing of headgear, as applied to observant Jews who are 
required by Jewish law to wear a yarmulke (skullcap);66 and a law prohibiting 
public employees, on pain of discharge, from using illicit drugs, as applied to a 
 
 64. For an interesting approach to this question, as well as a survey of other scholars’ views, see 
Bressman, supra note 10. 
 65. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 66. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
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Native American who ingests peyote as part of a religious ceremony.67  The 
question arising from this conflict is often phrased as whether the Clause 
guarantees religious observers substantive neutrality or merely formal 
neutrality.68  If the Free Exercise Clause requires only formal neutrality, then 
these laws are constitutional because they apply to all citizens equally.  If the 
clause requires substantive neutrality, on the other hand, some scholars argue 
that, because religious observers are uniquely burdened by the laws, they must 
be exempted from the laws’ strictures to be treated truly equally.69 
The use of the term “neutrality,” however, masks the fact that interpreting 
the Free Exercise Clause implicates both liberty and equality.  It is only if we 
wish to protect both the liberty to engage in religious practices and the equality 
of all citizens, that tensions arise over the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.  
If we are concerned only with equality, we should not care why some citizens 
are burdened, nor should we lift those burdens selectively.  Citizens whose 
objections are moral or otherwise compelling but not religiously grounded are 
similarly burdened, but they have never been constitutionally entitled to an 
exemption from neutral laws.70  Arguments supporting a difference in treatment 
must be based on a determination that liberty to practice one’s religion should 
be more strongly protected than general liberty of conduct.71  While such a 
conclusion may or may not be justifiable as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation, it is nevertheless an argument more about the liberty of some 
than about the equality of all.  Put otherwise, by defining religious and other 
objectors as not similarly situated, the doctrine of substantive neutrality 
considers religious practices a protected liberty that trumps the principle of 
treating all citizens equally. 
Substantive neutrality, then, is closer to liberty than to equality.  If 
exemptions are available to religious believers, but not to other citizens with 
nontrivial objections to compliance, then the unique privilege afforded to 
religious believers is more accurately described as the liberty to practice their 
religion notwithstanding the state’s interest in law enforcement.  Thus, one can 
view the choice between formal neutrality and substantive neutrality as a choice 
between equality (treating everyone the same) and liberty (giving religious 
believers protection against the state’s attempt to compel them to conform their 
 
 67. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 68. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Towards Relig-
ion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. 
REV. 1; Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685 (1992). 
 69. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
 70. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216 (noting that, if Amish objections to Wisconsin’s compulsory school 
attendance law had been secular rather than religious, the objections would have been insufficient). 
 71. Some scholars who maintain that the Free Exercise Clause requires accommodation of reli-
gious objection do in fact argue that the Clause contains a substantive protection of religious liberty, 
including protection from incidental infringement (infringement that is incidental to a law’s application 
rather than its primary objective).  See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the 
Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1137 (1990). 
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behavior to legislated norms).  Although the competing concerns are not 
conventionally described this way, doing so will enable us to apply the insights 
gained in the earlier examination of freedom of association to shed light on the 
Religion Clauses. 
B. The Establishment Clause 
Turning to the Establishment Clause, one of the core disputes is the extent 
to which it permits or requires government funding of religious institutions on 
an equal footing with analogous secular institutions.  Again, although not the 
conventional nomenclature, the competing values here can be described as 
interests in liberty and equality.  When the government subsidizes educational, 
charitable, or other organizations, equality principles suggest that it should not 
deny funding to similarly situated religious institutions.  On the other hand, one 
purpose of the Establishment Clause may be to preclude the government from 
subsidizing religion, regardless of whether it subsidizes other groups; the 
underlying value is to prevent citizens from being required to support religion 
with tax dollars.  That underlying value can be characterized as a liberty 
interest: The Establishment Clause protects the freedom of taxpayers not to 
support religion in any way.72 
C. Characterizing the Religion Clauses Jurisprudence 
Thus, both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause pose the 
same tension between the competing values of liberty and equality as that 
raised by the association cases.  Characterizing the Supreme Court’s resolution 
of this tension in the context of the Religion Clauses, however, is more complex 
than it is in the context of the right of association.  For one thing, we must 
analyze the jurisprudence of both clauses; for another, the Court has recently 
reversed course under both clauses. 
The Warren and Burger Courts tended to favor liberty under both clauses.  
Under the Free Exercise Clause, the Court required generally applicable laws 
to be justified by a compelling government interest if such laws placed a 
substantial burden on religious practices.73  This doctrine was perhaps honored 
more in the breach than in the observance,74 but it was at least an aspiration.  
Under my theory, then, by granting special privileges to religious objectors, the 
Court valued liberty of religious observers over equality among objecting 
citizens.  But the Warren Court, and to a somewhat lesser extent, the Burger 
Court, also favored liberty in its interpretation of the Establishment Clause.  
The Court during this era permitted—indeed required—discrimination against 
 
 72. Kathleen Sullivan has suggested that the Establishment Clause creates a somewhat different 
“liberty”: a substantive right to a purely secular government.  Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Lib-
eral Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195 (1992). 
 73. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
 74. Suzanna Sherry, Lee v. Weisman, Paradox Redux, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 128, 150 & n.104; 
Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701 (1986). 
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religion when it came to government funding, excluding religious institutions 
from some forms of government largesse available to similar charitable or 
educational institutions.75  It thus protected the liberty of taxpayers at the 
expense of equality between religious and nonreligious organizations. 
The Rehnquist Court has inverted its predecessors’ relationships between 
the Religion Clauses and the liberty-equality tension.  In Employment Division 
v. Smith,76 the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause permits the government 
to enforce generally applicable laws even against religious objectors.  The Court 
thus signaled that treating all citizens alike is more important than protecting 
religious liberty.  Concurrently, the Court has relaxed the ban on government 
funding of religious organizations, permitting,77 and sometimes requiring,78 
government funding of religious institutions on an equal basis with other 
institutions.  Here again, the Rehnquist Court favors equality over liberty, 
mandating equal treatment despite infringing upon individual liberty by 
coercing taxpayers to subsidize religious institutions.79 
If this description of each Court is accurate, where does that leave politics?  
The same Court that privileged liberty over equality in the association cases is 
now privileging equality over liberty in the religion cases.  And many of the 
progressive scholars who find Dale unconscionable for upholding 
discriminatory practices are equally apoplectic over both the abandonment of 
the compelling interest test in the Free Exercise context and the easing of 
prohibitions on government funding in cases such as Rosenberger and Zelman.  
At the same time, conservatives who applaud the funding cases (and often Dale 
as well) make common cause with progressives in opposing Smith. 
This confusing mass of alignments should not surprise us once we recognize 
that all of us—progressive and conservative, Justice and scholar—are engaging 
in a delicate and sophisticated balancing act.  Not only each clause, but each 
case, requires us to weigh the competing constitutional values of liberty and 
equality in a particular factual context, against a particular precedential and 
ideological backdrop.  Change any aspect and it is difficult to predict the likely, 
or appropriate, outcome of a case. 
 
 75. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Meek 
v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  In Lemon, Meek, and 
Wolman, the Court invalidated state statutes providing state aid to church-related schools, while in 
Aguilar, the Court specifically barred the use of federal funds to pay salaries of public employees teach-
ing in parochial schools. 
 76. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 77. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (upholding an Ohio statute providing tui-
tion aid to students choosing to attend a participating private school); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 
(2000) (overruling Meek, 421 U.S. at 349, and Wolman, 433 U.S. at 229); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 
103 (1997) (overruling Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 402). . 
 78. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 79. For an analogous description of recent cases as pitting the right of association against the prin-
ciples of the establishment clause, see Steven G. Gey, The No Religion Zone: Constitutional Limitations 
on Religious Association in the Public Sphere, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1885 (2001). 
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To see the subtlety of the questions, consider such issues as tax deductions 
for charitable contributions or fire protection for churches.  No one argues that 
the government should not provide fire protection, and few, if any, argue that 
contributions to religious organizations should be treated differently than 
contributions to other nonprofit organizations.  But why not, since it means that 
government is in some sense subsidizing religious associations by absorbing a 
cost that would otherwise accrue to the association?  To treat churches the same 
way that we treat schools, we are overriding the constitutionally valued freedom 
of those who wish to withhold all financial support from religious institutions.  
The reason must be that the equality principle in these contexts outweighs the 
liberty principle, even for progressives—but that is not necessarily true in all 
contexts. 
Again, then, it is misleading to characterize Zelman or Rosenberger as 
conservative interpretations of the First Amendment.  The cases raise difficult 
questions pitting one constitutional value against another.  The Court’s opinions 
are defective, but not because they reach the wrong or conservative answer.  
Instead, like Dale, they reflect a failure to properly consider one of the 
competing constitutional values—in this case, the liberty interest in not being 
forced to support religion.  Had the Court truly grappled with the hard 
questions, it might nevertheless have reached the same conclusions, but it might 
have persuaded progressives that those conclusions were reasonable (or even 
correct). 
IV 
ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS 
If associating varying political ideologies with liberty and equality is asking 
the wrong question, what are the right questions?  One question might be 
whether a general preference for liberty in the context of association and for 
equality in the context of religion is fairly labeled conservative.  In the course of 
constructing an answer to that question, however, one would have to examine 
and reject alternative explanations for the pattern of preferences.  Maybe 
religious and other intermediate organizations are socially vital or historically 
privileged.  Maybe discrimination based on religion is more dangerous than 
other types of discrimination.  Maybe the American people—from the 
Founders onward—are more concerned about limiting government’s ability to 
do harm than fostering government’s ability to do good (and maybe the concern 
is warranted).  Or maybe none of these things are true and the Rehnquist 
Court’s pattern cannot be justified.  The point is that we cannot label one 
particular set of resolutions to the dilemma posed by competing constitutional 
values without actually grappling with the dilemma ourselves.  And once we 
have done that hard substantive work, we have better ammunition against 
erroneous Court decisions than a derogatory label.  In that sense, then, the right 
question is simply whether the Court got it right in any particular case. 
04_SHERRY_FINAL.FMT.DOC 11/16/2004  12:20 PM 
Summer 2004] LABELING CONSTITUTIONS 49 
Once we remove our gaze from politics, we can also begin to ask other 
questions.  We should be troubled by the Court’s systematic undervaluing of 
constitutional principles, whatever those principles are.  We might ask ourselves 
why the Court sometimes refuses to grapple with the tension, preferring instead 
to cast the issues in one-sided ways.  Why do we seem to be losing what Robert 
McCloskey once called “one of the most significant qualities of the American 
political mind at all stages of national history”: a “propensity to hold 
contradictory ideas simultaneously”?80  Here we might tentatively assign blame 
to trends in constitutional scholarship.  Much of recent constitutional 
scholarship has itself ignored nuances, tensions, and inconsistencies, searching 
instead for an overarching theory that will make constitutional law predictable 
and coherent—and politically congenial.81 
A case in point is the title of this Symposium, illustrative of a broader 
change: Why has “progressive” replaced “liberal” as the adjective of choice for 
those on the political left?  It is not because those favoring the term have a 
coherent vision of what either term means.  Instead, the use of “progressive” by 
the left is much like the appropriation of the term “federalist” by a particular 
faction on the right.  Both terms evoke the winning side in earlier disputes—the 
Progressives of the early twentieth century, whose views are perceived to have 
prevailed by the 1940s, and the Federalists of the late eighteenth century, who 
succeeded in their goal of substantially increasing national power.82  Both leave 
their opponents at a rhetorical disadvantage: what are you if you are not 
progressive?  (The disadvantage of being labeled an “anti-Federalist” is 
historical rather than linguistic, but is otherwise similar.)  Finally, and most 
important, both are misleading: twenty-first century progressives do not reflect 
the views of twentieth-century Progressives,83 and the modern Federalist Society 
takes a much more constricted view of national power than did its eighteenth-
century counterparts.84 
The move from liberal to progressive (as well as the evocatively named 
Federalist Society) is reflective of the migration from scholarship to politics that 
has characterized much of recent legal academic writing.  It falsely implies a 
full-blown constitutional theory based on sound philosophical analysis that 
answers all the hard questions in constitutional law.  It polarizes the debate and 
 
 80. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 13 (1960). 
 81. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CERTAINTY: THE 
MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002).  Certainly this is not true of all con-
stitutional scholars, but it is true of some of the most prominent ones. 
 82. For an argument that the eighteenth-century Federalists may have misappropriated the term in 
similar ways, see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 175-76 (1990). 
 83. For one elaboration of this view, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE 
PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL 
COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2000). 
 84. For one elaboration of this view, focusing on the anti-nationalist Supreme Court’s misuse of 
leading nationalist Alexander Hamilton, see David McGowan, Ethos in Law and History: Alexander 
Hamilton, The Federalist, and the Supreme Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 755 (2001). 
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stigmatizes one’s opponents.  It exacerbates the tendency to use labels instead 
of grappling with issues, and it lends itself to a lack of nuance.  If legal 
scholarship has any influence on the Supreme Court, it should not be surprising 
that the Court is moving in a similar direction.  To the extent that constitutional 
scholars are the cause, however, they can also help with the solution: if our 
scholarship becomes more pragmatic, more doctrinal, more comparative, more 
historical, more empirical, and less overwhelmingly meta-theoretical, we might 
force the Court to confront the hard questions. 
Finally, there is the question of manipulating the facts to reach desired 
results.  Many commentators have noted how the majority manipulated the 
facts in Dale to create a stronger associational interest than the Boy Scouts 
actually had.85  Many of the same Justices engaged in similar practices in the 
religion cases. 
In Mitchell v. Helms,86 a predecessor to Zelman that was decided on the 
same day as Dale, the plurality upheld direct, per-capita aid to religious schools.  
By characterizing that aid as identical to portable benefits (such as a deaf 
student’s right to an interpreter) given to students to take to any school they 
wish, the plurality avoided difficult questions about the liberty values inherent 
in the Establishment Clause.  It seems churlish, as well as unconstitutional 
under precedent, to deny to a deaf student a federally funded interpreter just 
because that student chooses to attend a religious school.  When the state gives 
books, maps, and computers directly to religious schools, however, it raises 
harder questions—unless, as the plurality did in Mitchell, we disingenuously 
characterize the direct aid program as “distribut[ing] benefits neutrally to any 
child.”87 
In Rosenberger, the same plurality collapsed another important factual 
distinction, this time between providing a forum for religious speech (clearly 
required under earlier cases) and providing funds to disseminate religious 
speech.  Earlier cases had involved public spaces that were available for most 
groups or speakers, and the Court had held that religious groups or speakers 
could not be excluded simply because they were religious.  In Rosenberger, the 
University of Virginia allocated monies from its Student Activities Fund to pay 
printing costs for publications by authorized student groups.  It refused to pay 
such costs for a student organization that published Wide Awake: A Christian 
Perspective at the University of Virginia.  The plurality characterized the Student 
Activities Fund as a public forum, albeit “more in a metaphysical than in a 
spatial or geographic sense,” thus making the physical forum cases directly 
relevant.88  The plurality also ignored the proselytizing nature of the publication, 
 
 85. See, e.g., sources cites supra note 28.  
 86. 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
 87. Id. at 811 (plurality opinion) (quoting Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 
(1993)).  Justice O’Connor, who provided the necessary fifth vote, declined to join the opinion in part 
because it elided this distinction.  Id. at 842 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
 88. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995). 
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merely describing it as offering a “Christian viewpoint” and including articles 
on “racism, crisis pregnancy, stress, prayer, C.S. Lewis’ ideas about evil and free 
will, and reviews of religious music.”89  The dissent, by contrast, quoted 
extensively from the publication at issue, backing up the claim that the writing 
“is no merely descriptive examination of religious doctrine or even of ideal 
Christian practice,” but rather “a straightforward exhortation to enter into a 
relationship with God as revealed in Jesus Christ.”90 
In Rosenberger as in Dale, then, only a willful blindness to the facts allowed 
the Court to apply the particular precedent it did.  If the Boy Scouts as an 
organization did not actually endorse the anti-homosexual message it 
propounded for litigation purposes, then its expressive associational rights 
would not be harmed by retaining Dale.  If the religious student group was 
proselytizing rather than simply providing a Christian perspective, then their 
activities were not the same as those of other student groups and did not 
necessarily require equal treatment.  In both Rosenberger and Mitchell, when 
the Court was confronted with undeniable but uncomfortable distinctions—that 
physical space is not money and that portable benefits are different from direct 
aid to schools—the plurality glossed over those distinctions and recharacterized 
the facts.  In both cases, the recharacterization meant that the result followed 
almost inevitably from the precedent, and thus made the decision seem both 
easier and more justifiable. 
This manipulation of the facts presents a more serious threat to the regime 
and to the rule of law than would a narrowly conservative or progressive 
interpretation of the Constitution.  It is beyond the scope of this Essay to 
explore the causes for the apparent rise in such manipulation, or the cure for it.  
But I will make two speculations.  First, the post-modern denial that objective 
facts even exist certainly gives comfort to those who would put their own spin 
on the factual circumstances of a case.  The realists gave us infinitely malleable 
law, and the post-modernists have given us infinitely malleable facts.  Second, 
the judicial appointment process has, over the last twenty years, become so 
politicized that ideology now matters more than legal acumen, integrity, or 
character.  Together, these two developments are bound to lead to a Court 
more concerned with end results than with the law.  The more we attach labels 
to cases and constitutional doctrines, the more we contribute to that trend. 
V 
CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Here is a multiple-choice question: Which is more progressive, (a) 
protecting liberty or (b) protecting equality?  My answer is (c): both of the 
above.  The perennial problem, of course, is that liberty and equality are often 
 
 89. Id. at 826. 
 90. Id. at 867 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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in tension.  We cannot make the conflict go away by labeling one side or the 
other conservative or progressive. 
While it is bad form to attack one’s hosts, I would assert that this 
Symposium is a symptom of the same failure of vision that has beset the 
Supreme Court.  Rather than conceding that the Constitution is a mass of 
conflicting values that are often difficult or impossible to reconcile, we want to 
believe that it provides clear and correct answers to important questions as long 
as we can find the right theory of interpretation.  But interpreting the 
Constitution by means of an overarching theory or political vision is definitely 
asking the wrong question.  Let’s not kid ourselves: in a pluralist democracy 
committed to majoritarianism and rights, to liberty and equality, asking whether 
the Court “got it right” in any particular case is not an easy question.  But it’s 
the right one. 
